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LIST OF ALL PARTIES
The caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all individuals who were
parties to the proceeding in the trial court. These individuals are:
Appellee Kristen Hortin, who was a co-plaintiff at the trial court.
Appellee Michael Bowen, who was a co-plaintiff at the trial court.
Appellant Teak D. Jones, who was the defendant at the trial court.
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-3 (1998). Leases and Contracts for interest in lands.

iv

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a case decided on Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court
transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On the 5th day of May, 1998, Plaintiffs and defendant executed an agreement
entitled LEASE AND OPTION TO PURCHASE.
2. The term of the lease was stated to be March 1, 1998 to August 31, 1998. Said
lease further provided for lease payments of $648.00 per month and specified that time
was of the essence.
3. Page 3, paragraph 8 of said lease made it clear that both the lease and the
option to purchase would expire at the end of the lease term unless the option was
exercised prior to that time or unless all the parties agreed in writing that the lease and/or
option would continue on a month to month basis. If there were no agreement, then the
lease would terminate and would not even continue month to month. There was never an
agreement in writing between all parties as specified. The agreement on page 5, paragraph
12 further specifies that there can be no change or waiver regarding any portion of the
agreement unless agreed upon by all parties in writing.
4. The defendant failed to make all the lease payments due under the lease. The
defendant did not exercise his option prior to the August 31, 1998 deadline. Paragraph 9,
1
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page 4 of said Lease and Option to Purchase specifically provides that to exercise the
option, the defendant must do so and actually close the sale on or before August 31, 1998.
5. On November 25, 1998, the defendant attempted to assign his expired interest
in the lease and option to purchase to a Diana Marie Harrison. Said Assignment was
notarized by Wendie Thomsen of Ogden, Utah.
6. Also on November 25, 1998, the plaintiffs mailed a 5 day notice to vacate to
the Weber County Sheriff to be served on the defendant. This notice was served by the
Weber County Sheriff by posting the same on the door of the residence on November 30th,
1998 and mailing a copy of the same by mailing to the defendant on December 1, 1998.
7. On December 16, 1998, the Defendant was served with the Complaint and
Summons in the present matter and subsequently posted a counterbond.
8. In November of 1998, the defendant attempted to exercise his option by selling
the property to a third party. As mentioned above, the defendant later assigned his
interest in the lease and option to a 3rd party. As part of that transaction, the defendant
proposed to pay past lease payments (thereby admitting that he had not paid all lease
payments due under the agreement.) As mentioned above, the option had expired. No
document reinstating the option document was ever drafted or signed.
9. Throughout all times relevant tot his case, Michael Bowen's name remained on
the title to the real property as a joint tenant.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellee Michael Bowen and Appellee Kristen Hortin brought this action to evict
Appellant from certain premises located in Weber County. Prior to the eviction action,
appellant's Option To Purchase the property had expired and he was many months in
arrears in lease payments.
Both Appellees were owners of the subject real property, owning the same as joint
tenants even though they had previously been divorced. Appellant convinced appellee
Hortin to execute certain documents relating to a sale of the property not to him, but to a
Diana Harrison. Said sale was not completed and the present eviction action was brought.
No action has been brought on the failed sale to Diana Harrison, nor has any action been
filed to attempt enforcement of the earlier expired option to purchase.
There is no claim made that appellant relief to his detriment on any representation
or either appellee made before the option to purchase expired, nor is there any evidence or
claim that appellant was the person named in the sales documents executed by appellee
Hortin.
This appeal is simply an attempt for the appellant to try to retain his lost option on
the property and Summary Judgment was appropriately granted by the trial court.
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ARGUMENT
RESPONSE TO ISSUES AS RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT
ISSUE: Did the trail court err in determining by summary judgment that Appellee
Michael Bowen, following his divorce from Appellee Kristen Hortin, retained an
ownership interest in the real property which would allow him to interfere with the
purchase of the property by Appellant from Hortin.
There are two very simple responses to this issue. First, irrespective of the
wording in the Divorce Decree (however a court may choose to interpret it), Mr. Bowen's
name remained on the title to the real property following the divorce and to this day
remains on the title to the property. So long as that title status continued, he was
therefore required to agree to any sale or other transfer of the property before an effective
transfer could be made. Second, no matter what the status of the title to property, the
failure of sale that the appellant complains about was not to appellant, but to a third party.
Even if the attempted sale had been to Appellant, his attempt to exercise the option would
have been futile because the option had expired, not been renewed and anything that
remained had been assigned to a 3rd party. The state of the law respecting the exercise or
acceptance of an option is not in doubt. In 91 C I S . Vendor and Purchaser Section 10
(1955) as follows:
The acceptance of an option, to be effectual, must be unqualified, absolute,
4

unconditional, unequivocal, ambiguous, positive, without reservation, and according to
the terms or conditions of the option. Substantial compliance with the terms of the option
is held not sufficient to constitute an acceptance; to be effectual, the acceptance must be
identical with the offer, or at least, there must be no substantial variation between them.
This rule of unqualified and absolute acceptance has been long adhered to by the
Utah courts. See Nance v. Schoonover, 521 P.2d 896 (Utah, 1974) and Lincoln Land and
Development Co. v. Thompson, 26 Utah 2d 324, 489 P.2d 426 (1971).
In the present case, the defendant did nothing to exercise his option during the
option period. Later, he attempted to assign the expired option to a 3rd party and a third
party attempted to purchase the property, but the sale was not completed.
The eviction action was brought months after the option had expired. Where a
contract states that time is of the essence, cases hold that both parties are discharged from
their contract obligations if neither makes tender by the agreed closing date. Triton Realty
Co. v. Friemaa 210 Md. 252, 123 A.2d 290 (1956); Usinger v. Campbell 280 Or. 751,
572 P.2d 1018 (1977); Guillorv Corp. v. Dussin Investment Co.. 272 Or. 267, 536 P.2d
501 (1975); 6 Corbin on Contracts s 1258 (1962).
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in determining by summary judgment that the option
agreement between Jones and Hortin was not extended through Hortin and Bowen's
acquiescence and Hortin's subsequent signing of closing documents which included
provision for payment of accrued rent.
As noted by the cases cited by Appellee Bowen above, for the option to purchase
the real property at issue to be extended, it would have to be done prior to the July 1,
5
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1998 deadline. The later acts by appellee Hortin to execute documents selling to a 3rd
party (without even mentioning the option) are insufficient to somehow extent the expired
option. See Nance v. Schoonover, 521 P.2d 896 (Utah, 1974) and Lincoln Land and
Development Co. v. Thompson, 26 Utah 2d 324, 489 P.2d 426 (1971).
While appellant claims acquiescence by appellees, he fails to note any facts in
support of that contention except the proposed sale to a 3rd party. Neither appellee did
anything with appellant to extend the option to purchase.
Appellant further goes on to claim that he had "clean hands" and should be granted
equitable relief The trial court correctly noted that the appellant was behind in his rent
payments thousands of dollars and that this action precluded him presenting himself as a
claimant with "clean hands." Appellant also claims that the rent payments were to be paid
under the contract with appellee Hortin, but fails to note that the appellant was not a party
to that agreement and no document is presented which indicates that appellant was the one
who was going to pay those back payments. Further, an offer to correct a default does
not erase the fact that a default had occurred and render the person suddenly an
appropriate party for equitable relief
ISSUE: Assuming that Appellee Bowen's approval for the sale of the property to
Appellant was not (sic) required and even if there was no extension of the option to
purchase, did the trial court err by failing tofindthat Appellee Hortin created a new and
binding contract for the sale of property by signing closing documents including a
warranty deed, or, in the alternative, does the merger doctrine apply to Appellee Hortin's
actions.
6
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As shown by Addendum E to appellant's brief, all closing documents and
agreements were between Kristen Hortin and Diana Harrison. Diana Harrison was not a
party to the lawsuit. The court therefore had no reason to look at whether a new and
binding contract of sale was created by appellee Hortin. Should Diana Harrison wish to
attempt to enforce a contract of sale, that would be her option, but does not involve the
eviction action in this case. Further, no matter who the buyer was, it is clear that
inasmuch as both appellees names were on the property, both would have to agree to the
sale.
In connection with the above issue, appellant claims that the Warranty Deed signed
by appellee Hortin somehow merged the earlier documents between Hortin, Bowen and
Jones. Appellant once again fails to mention that the Warranty Deed was not with Jones,
but was with Harrison. He also fails to note that for the Deed to be effective, it would
have had to have been signed by both owners of the property and proper delivery made of
the deed. It is undisputed that the sale never closed and the deed never delivered or
recorded. Without a closing and delivery of the deed, it is merely a piece of paper
expressing an intent to sell to Diana Harrison.
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CONCLUSION
The essential facts in this case are undisputed. The parties executed a lease with
an option to purchase. The option expired, the lease payments fell into default. One of
the Appellees executed some sales documents to a 3rd party (Diana Harrison), but the sale
was never closed. The present eviction action was brought by Appellees and Summary
Judgment Granted. There are no facts or inferences from these facts which would entitled
appellant to a trial in this matter.
Dated this / P

dtay of April. 2000.
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